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I. INTRODUCTION
In Rapanos v. United States, the United States Supreme Court delivered a 4-1-4 split decision that created two distinct alternatives for determination of the United States Army Corps of Engineers' ("Corps")
jurisdiction over wetlands "neighboring" non-navigable waters, or
tributaries of traditional "navigable waters."' Rapanos was a consolidated action of two cases from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:
United States v. Rapanos and Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.' In both cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held in favor of Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to
"tributaries" of navigable waters.3 In the consolidated action, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded both Circuit decisions for consideration of the facts of each case in light of the Court's alternative descriptions of the Corps' jurisdiction.4
As the Justices who filed opinions in Rapanos pointed out, the difficulty in specifying the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands is

1. Rapanos v. United States (Rapanos I1), 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). "Neighboring" is
a qualifier used to describe the term "adjacent" in the Corps regulations. 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(c).
2. Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Rapanos (Rapanos 1), 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004).
3. The courts in both these cases used the word "tributaries" to describe the drains
and streams adjacent to the wetlands at issue. Carabell,391 F.3d at 708-09; Rapanos I,
376 F.3d at 642.
4. Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct. at 2235.
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largely due to the language of the Clean Water Act ("CWA").5 The
CWA uses the words "navigable waters" to designate those watercourses
that Congress sought to protect with the CWA. The definition of
"navigable waters" engenders confusion and litigation and is at the
heart of the dispute in Rapanos. The CWA's stated purpose is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters.6 In order to accomplish that objective, section
404 of the CWA requires a permit from the Corps for the "discharge of
dredged or fill material" into the Nation's "navigable waters."7 Consequently, a developer wishing to fill wetlands may have to expend significant time and resources in obtaining the required permits.8 Aside
from the resource expenditures, though, the real dilemma for developers is determining which watercourses on their land are regulated
waters.9 The Corps regulates wetlands to the extent those wetlands
may be defined as "navigable waters." Consequently, the critical questions the Court faced in Rapanos were the permissible definition of
"navigable waters," and the extent wetlands must be related to those
waters to become subject to the Corps' jurisdiction.
Rapanos was the third case in which the Supreme Court addressed
the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA. In the first action, a unanimous Court granted the Corps jurisdiction over wetlands directly adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, or waters that fit the traditional definition of navigability.'" In the second case, a more divided Court (5-4
majority) refused to grant the Corps jurisdiction over "isolated ponds"
far from any navigable water." In Rapanos, the Court faced the question of the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands with a more attenuated
connection to navigable waters than those directly adjacent to navigable waters, but with a less attenuated connection than remote ponds
and swamps. Rapanos offered the Court the perfect opportunity to
5. See Steve Louthan, US. Supreme Court Sharply Split over Wetlands, URBAN LAND,
Jan. 2007, at 126 [hereinafter Louthan, Court Sharply Split].
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).

7.

Id. § 1344(a).

8.

See generally Rapanos II; Less costly and time consuming nationwide or regional

permits are available: "[g] eneral permits are often issued by USACE for categories of
activities that are similar in nature and would have only minimal individual or cumulative adverse environmental effects. General permits can be issued on a nationwide
("nationwide permit") or regional ("regional general permit") basis." UNITED STATES
ENV'T PROT. AGENCY, OVERVIEW OF EPA AUTHORITIES FOR NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGERS
DEVELOPING AQUATIC INVASIvE SPECIES RAPID RESPONSE AND MANAGEMENT PLANS: CWA
SECTION 404-PERMITS TO DISCHARGE DREDGED OR FILL MATERIAL, http://www.epa.gov/

owow/invasive species/invasives management/cwa404.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2007).
9. Louthan, Court Sharply Split, supra note 5, at 126.
10. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside Bayview II), 474 U.S.

121,133 (1985).
11. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 171-72 (2001).
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clarify the exact extent of Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands.'" However,
the Court's dual holdings in Rapanos only obscured the scope of the
Corps' regulatory authority behind two competing tests that are neither completely loyal to the language of the CWA, nor directly track
Court precedent under the CWA.
U. PRE-RAPANOS
The Court's first attempt at interpreting the Corps' jurisdiction
under the CWA took place in 1985, thirteen years after the Act's enactment and over a decade after the Corps promulgated regulations
defining the scope of its jurisdiction." In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the parties sought a judicial determination of whether
an eighty-acre wetland owned by Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. was an
"adjacent wetland" within the meaning of the CWA and therefore subject to the Corps' jurisdiction." The disputed wetland abutted Lake St.
Clair, a traditionally-navigable lake and, although no continuous surface hydrological connection existed between the wetland and lake,
the wetland was susceptible to periodic inundation during times of
high lake levels.'" Faced with drawing a line where no clear line existed, the Court-in a unanimous decision-chose to give deference to
the Corps' regulations. The Court held that, although no continuous
surface hydrological connection actually existed between the wetland
and the traditionally navigable waterway, the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over the Riverside Bayview wetland was nonetheless in harmony
with the language, policies, and history of the CWA. 6
Subsequent to the Riverside Bayview holding, the Court's unanimous endorsement of the regulations promulgated by the Corps lead
to the Corps adopting increasingly broad interpretations of its own
regulations under the CWA.'7 "For example, in 1986, to 'clarify' the
reach of its jurisdiction, the Corps announced the so-called 'Migratory
Bird Rule,' which purported to extend its jurisdiction to any intrastate
waters '[w]hich are or would be used as habitat' by migratory birds."'8
In fact, it was the adoption of the Migratory Bird Rule which would
lead to the Court's second opinion regarding the Corps' jurisdiction

12.

ChanningJ. Martin, Supreme Court Decides Clean Water Act Cases, 38

SEC. OF THE ENV'T, ENERGY,

& RES.

NEWSLETTER 1, 1

TRENDS:

ABA

(2006).

13. Riverside Bayview 11,474 U.S. at 123-24 & n. 1.
14. Id. at 124-25.
15. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside Bayview 1), 729 F.2d
391, 393-94 (6th Cir. 1984).
16. Riverside Bayview 11, 474 U.S. at 465; see also Steve Louthan, FederalJurisdiction
Under the Clean Water Act After Rapanos, 35 COLO. LAw. 47, 48 (Dec. 2006) [hereinafter
Louthan, FederalJurisdiction].
17. Rapanos II, 126 S.Ct. at 2216.
18. Id. at 2216-17.
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under the CWA in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers (" SWANCC') . "
In SWANCC, a consortium of municipalities sought to convert an
abandoned sand and gravel pit into a disposal site for nonhazardous
solid waste."0 Since its abandonment, a number of permanent and seasonal ponds had formed, thereby providing a habitat to migratory
birds." Because of its isolated location, the proposed site did not have
any hydrological connection with, nor was it adjacent to any traditionally navigable waterway and therefore lacked a significant nexus to a
navigable waterway.'
In its ruling, apparently becoming somewhat
disenchanted with the Corps' unbridled exercise of jurisdiction over
non-navigable waterways, the Court, in a 5-4 majority decision, concluded the Corps had overstepped its jurisdictional authority.23 In so
doing, the Court effectively applied the breaks to what had previously
been a carte blanche approach by Corps in interpreting its own jurisdiction under the CWA.

m. THE RAPANOS PLURALITY
In Rapanos, the Court faced a new challenge when confronted with
wetlands that did not match the geographical characteristics found in
either Riverside Bayview or SWANCC. As a result, the distinct geographic nature of the disputed wetlands in Rapanos proved to be even
more problematic for the Court to make a statutory interpretation
than its predecessors in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC. In the plurality
decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court employed a piece-meal
approach to interpret an inherently ambiguous statute. Although Justice Scalia dedicated a considerable amount of his opinion refuting the
reasoning championed by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion
and by Justice Stevens in the dissenting opinion, he established a twoprong test to determine if a wetland similarly situated to the Rapanos
and Carbell sites was in fact a wetland covered by the CWA.24 The test
requires two findings:
First, that the adjacent channel contains a "wate[r] of the United
States," (i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 164 (2001).
Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 174.
RapanosII, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2226 (2006).
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continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to
determine where the "water" ends and the "wetland" begins.25
The first prong of the Scalia Test, requiring that the adjacent
channel contain "waters of the United States," draws its authority, in
part, from the ordinary parlance of the word "waters" as defined by
Webster's New International Dictionary." Because the ordinary usage
of the word "waters" connotes relatively permanent standing or flowing
bodies of water, wetlands that are adjacent to waterways that contain
only ephemeral flows necessarily fail to qualify a wetland as a covered
water under the CWA.27
Justice Scalia also cited the statutory language of the CWA in support of his position. 8 By virtue of the Act distinguishing between
"point sources" and "navigable waters," in its own language, the Act
excludes channels and conduits that typically carry intermittent flows
of water as "waters of the United States."' Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, if a channel adjacent to a wetland qualifies as a "point
source" as defined by the CWA, it will typically not occupy the dual role
of a navigable water.'
The second prong of the Scalia Test, requiring that the wetland has
a continuous surface connection with a relatively permanent standing
or flowing body of water, is rooted in a commingling of the Court's
reasoning found in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC.2 While recognizing
that not all wetlands implicate the boundary-drawing problem found in
Riverside Bayview, Justice Scalia noted that the significant-nexus test
espoused by the Court in SWANCC does not apply in situations where a
wetland is only intermittently connected to a covered water." By making this distinction, Justice Scalia allowed himself the opportunity to
embrace a more easily discernable requirement-namely that there is a
continuous surface connection with the covered water.
TV. JUSTICE ROBERTS' CONCURRENCE
Justice Roberts, in his concurring opinion, took the opportunity to
point out that the Corps' defeat in Rapanos could easily have been
avoided had the Corps provided "guidance meriting deference" by
promulgating rules that fit within the Court's ruling in SWANCC' In25.

Id. at 2227.

26.
27.
28.

Id. at 2220-21.
Id. at 2222.
Id. at 2222-23.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2226.
Id.

33.
34.

Id. at 2226-27.
Id. at 2236 (Roberts,J., concurring).
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stead, the Corps' choice to "adhere to its essentially boundless view of
the scope of its power" caused a divided court to adopt a requirement
that lower courts decide jurisdictional questions arising under the
CWA "on a case-by-case basis.""

V. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy filed a concurrence in the plurality's holding to
vacate and remand the decisions in the consolidated cases for "further
fact-finding," but could not agree with either the plurality's or the dissent's definitions of the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands.' Justice
Kennedy characterized the plurality's requirements for jurisdiction
over wetlands as limitations "without support in the language and purposes of the Act. .

. .""

He claimed the plurality's first requirement

"makes little practical sense in a statute concerned with downstream
water quality ...,"' and described the plurality's second requirement as
lacking in appropriate deference to the Corps ability to distinguish
wetlands from navigable waters. 9 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy
elected not to side with the dissent because the dissent offered to grant
the Corps too much deference.' He feared that the Chevron deference
the dissent offered the Corps would allow the Corps jurisdiction over
waters too far removed from navigable waters."
Many consider Justice Kennedy's categorization of the Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands the controlling holding from Rapanos." The "basic rules of legal interpretation long accepted by the federal judiciary"
give precedence to Justice Kennedy's conclusion because it concurs
with the plurality's holding to deny jurisdiction to the Corps on the
narrowest grounds.' Justice Kennedy commended the Sixth Circuit
for "recognizing" the "significant nexus" test formulated in SWANCC as
the appropriate test for determining if wetlands constitute navigable
waters." However, Justice Kennedy concurred with the decision to vacate and remand because the Sixth Circuit failed to "consider all the
factors necessary to determine that the lands in question had, or did
not have, the requisite nexus.""
35.

Id.

36.
37.

Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Martin, supra note 12, at 14.
RapanosII, 126 S. Ct. at 2242 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

38.
39.
40.

Id. at 2242.
Id. at 2244-45.
Idat 2249.
Id, see generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

41.
837 (1984).
42. Marks v. United States, 430 US 188, 193 (1997); United States v. Gerke, 464
F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006); Louthan, Court Sharply Split, supranote 5, at 127.
43. Louthan, Court Sharply Split, supra note 5, at 127.
44. Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct at 2250 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

45.

Id at 2236.
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Justice Kennedy crafted a two-part test for determination of the
Corps' jurisdiction over wetlands."6 The first part of his test would address wetlands directly adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, while the
second part would deal with wetlands neighboring non-navigable waters, or drains and tributaries like those at issue in the consolidated
cases. 47
In a "straightforward affirmation" of Riverside Bayview, and in deference to the Corps' regulations, Justice Kennedy based the first prong
of his test on "adjacency."48 The first part of Justice Kennedy's test is
satisfied and jurisdiction granted to the Corps over wetlands directly
adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, as one commentator has noted,
"because there is a reasonable inference that there is an ecological
connection between the wetland and the navigable waterway. 49 Justice
Kennedy asserted that, insome instances, a wetland adjacent to a navigable-in-fact water may be so connected or proximally situated to the
navigable water that the "Corps may deem the wetland a 'navigable
water' under the Act."' The Corps, then, "may rely on adjacency to
establish its jurisdiction" over wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact
waters." The first part of Justice Kennedy's test enables ready determinations of the Corps jurisdiction over waters or wetlands directly adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters. However, the wetlands at issue in the
consolidated cases before the Court did not abut waters traditionally
considered navigable. The wetlands at issue in the consolidated cases
bordered drains, streams, or other tributaries to non-navigable waters.
The second part of Justice Kennedy's test addressed the more
complicated task of determining jurisdiction over waters or wetlands
that are adjacent to or neighbor non-navigable tributaries of navigable
waterways." He based the second part of his test on the "significant
nexus" model introduced in SWANCC.53 Also, in accordance with the
text, structure, and purpose of the Act, Justice Kennedy concluded that
jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to non-navigable waters must be
granted to the Corps where "the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters
more readily understood as 'navigable."'54
Justice Kennedy did not provide any specific criteria for what constitutes a "significant nexus," but rejected jurisdiction where "wetlands
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Steve Louthan, FederalJurisdiction,supranote 16, at 49.
Rapanos II, 126 S.Ct. at 2246-48 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See 33 CFR § 328.3 (a) (7); Louthan, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 16, at 49.
Louthan, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 16, at 49.
Rapanos II, 126 S.Ct. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2249.

52.
53.

Id.
Id.

54.

Id. at 2248.
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effects on water quality are speculative or insubstantial."" Moreover,
he labeled the Corps' existing regulatory standard for tributaries too
broad to be determinative.' Justice Kennedy did not specify particular
actions that unquestionably affect the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters," but he negated the Corps' ability
to continue to rely on a hydrological connection to establish jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to non-navigable waters. 7 He stated
"[g] iven the role wetlands play in pollutant filtering, flood control, and
runoff storage, it may well be the absence of hydrologic connection...
that shows the wetlands' significance for the aquatic system. ' By refining and relying on the "significant nexus" test, Justice Kennedy also
supplanted the Ordinary High Water Mark ("OHWM") test the Corps
previously relied upon to establish jurisdiction over tributaries to navigable waters. 9
Legal scholars have argued that Justice Kennedy's nexus test suggests that the Corps evaluate the "wetland's overall role in the aquatic
system and provide a significant measure concerning how the action
will affect downstream water quality."'
What is clear to scholars,
though, is that Justice Kennedy's somewhat obscure test forces the
Corps to "establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis when it
seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to nonnavigable tributaries."6 A case-by-case analysis will be necessary at least until Congress
or the Corps provides a more concrete rule that satisfies the nexus requirements."
VI. THE DISSENT
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg
joined, dissented from both the plurality's decision and Justice Kennedy's concurrence.' Justice Breyer filed a separate dissent.' Justice
Stevens claimed the "plurality disregard [ed] the nature of the congressional delegation to the [Corps] and the technical and complex character of the issues at stake" in its decision to vacate and remand the
consolidated cases.' He characterized the plurality's holding as a 'judicial amendment" to the Act, and claimed that no part of the Act "requires the relatively permanent presence of water" to qualify for regu55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 2249.

57.

Id. at 2251.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Rapanos II, 126 S. Ct. at 2237.
Louthan, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 16, at 50.
Id.
RapanosII, 126 S. Ct. at 2242-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

63.

Id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

64.

Id. at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

65.

Id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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lation.' As for Justice Kennedy's concurrence, Justice Stevens asserted
that it failed to "defer sufficiently to the Corps," while allowing that
Justice Kennedy was "more faithful to [the Court's] precedents and to
principles of statutory interpretation than [was] the plurality[]."67 Justice Stevens pointed out that Justice Kennedy's test would create additional uncertainty, extra work for all parties, and would not provide
developers with any "certain way of knowing whether they need to get §
404 permits or not. " ' According to Justice Stevens, "[i] n the final
analysis,

. .

. concerns about the appropriateness of the Corps'... im-

plementation of the Clean Water Act should be addressed to Congress
'
or the Corps rather than to the Judiciary."69
Justice Stevens based his analysis squarely on the unanimous holding of Riverside Bayview." The dissent concluded that, akin to the deference the Court afforded the Corps in Riverside Bayview, the Court
should have granted Chevron deference to the Corps' definition of its
jurisdiction in the consolidated cases.7' He classified the Corps' exercise of jurisdiction over wetlands as the "quintessential example of the
Executive's reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision."7" Based
on "Congress' deliberate acquiescence in the Corps' regulations in
1977," Justice Stevens argued that Congress intended that the Corps,
not the Court, should determine the nature and extent of wetlands
and their connection to navigable waters. 2 He stated that "[b] ecause
there is ambiguity in the phrase 'waters of the United States' and because interpreting it broadly to cover such ditches and streams advances the purpose of the Act, the Corps' approach should command
our deference."74 Justice Stevens called for the reinstatement of the
judgments in the consolidated cases if the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's tests are met.7 Justice Stevens accepted the application of either

test because the dissent would have upheld the basis for the Corps'
jurisdiction in the consolidated cases anyway, and would grant jurisdiction "in all other cases in which either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied."7'
Justice Breyer also filed a dissent based on a more robust deference
standard than the plurality was willing to grant. He asserted that because the nation's waters are so "intricately interconnected," Congress
66.
67.

Id. at2260.
Id, at 2252.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 2265.
Id. at 2259.
Id. at 2255.
Id. at 2253.
I at 2252.
Id. at 2257-58.
Id. at 2262.
Id, at 2265
Id.

74.

75.
76.
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intentionally left their definition vague to allocate to the "enforcing
agency... the task of restricting the scope of that definition, either
wholesale through regulation or retail through development permissions."' In his dissent, Justice Breyer noted that the Corps' experts
were better suited than the Court to determine which wetlands fall
under Corps' juisdiction.' He also observed that until the Corps updates its regulations to coincide with the plurality's orJustice Stevens's
jurisdictional tests, "courts will have to make ad hoc determinations that
run the risk of transforming scientific questions into matters of law."'
VII. POST-RAPANOS
Over a dozen United States circuit court of appeals cases and
United States district court cases have addressed the limit of the Corps'
jurisdiction since Rapanos. The First Circuit held that either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's tests are apposite for establishing Corps' jurisdiction.' The Seventh and Ninth Circuits support the Kennedy concurrence as "the controlling rule in their respective circuits."8 ' For
example, in Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, the
Ninth Circuit exhaustively applied Justice Kennedy's significant nexus
test to find that Healdsburg violated the CWA by discharging wastewater into a man-made pond containing wetlands that border additional
wetlands adjacent to the Russian River, a traditional navigable water. "
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found: a significant chemical nexus established by elevated chloride levels in the stretch of the Russian River
adjacent to the wetlands abutting the pond clearly resulting from chloride leaching into the wetlands and River from the pond, adjacent wetlands, and underlying tributary aquifer; a significant physical nexus
between the pond and the Russian River based on a surface connection between the two when the river overflows its levee and the "two
bodies of water commingle;" and a significant biological nexus based
on the indistinguishable ecological connections between the pond and
the river whereby bird, mammal and fish populations indigenous to
Russian River were impossible to differentiate from those found in the
wetlands adjacent to the river and the pond itself.
In March, 2007, the Corps reissued all existing Nationwide Permits
("NWPs") currently effective in part to provide better protection and
77. Id at 2266 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
78. Id (citing33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)).
79. Id. at 2266.
80. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006).
81. United States v. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006); N. Cal.
River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
Louthan, FederalJurisdiction,supra note 16, at 50.
82. Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 2007 WL 2230186 (9th
Cir. 2006).
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definitions of "intermittent and ephemeral streams and their adjacent
wetlands."83 Then, in June, 2007, the Corps and EPA simultaneously
adjusted their jurisdictional standards to better reflect the Rapanos decision. 4 The new Corps' and EPA regulations now grant jurisdiction to
the agencies over the following waters: traditional navigable waters,
wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters, non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters that are "relatively permanent" or
flow "year-round," non-navigable tributaries that flow seasonally for at
least three months, and wetlands that "directly abut" non-navigable
tributaries." The agencies will determine jurisdiction on a case-by-case
basis utilizing the significant nexus test over the following waters: nonnavigable tributaries with relatively intermittent flow, wetlands adjacent
to intermittent tributaries, and wetlands adjacent to ("but do not
abut") relatively permanent non-navigable tributaries.'6 The agencies
intend to apply the significant nexus test by "assess[ing] the flow characteristics and functions of the tributary itself and the functions performed by all wetlands adjacent to the tributary to determine if they
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the downstream traditional navigable waters.. .include[ing] consideration of hydrologic and ecologic factors.""7 The agencies will not assert
jurisdiction over "swales or erosional features" or ditches "excavated
wholly in or draining only uplands" with only intermittent flow.'
VIII. CONCLUSION

The new agency guidelines should shed some light on the dual
tests promulgated by Rapanos. Indeed, in United States v. Moses, the
Ninth Circuit recently relied on the new guidelines to find Moses violated the CWA by significantly manipulating a non-navigable tributary
that only flowed seasonally during the spring runoff. 9 While Moses was
a bad actor that continuously ignored agency desist orders, the decision clearly expands the definition of waters of the United States over
definitions previously relied upon the EPA and the Corps prior to Rapanos. However, questions persist. The Moses decision seems to
broaden the definition of waters of the United States beyond the limit
the Rapanos plurality was willing to grant to intermittent non-navigable
tributaries. Yet, the Ninth Circuit did not undergo the extensive fact
83.

Reissuance of Nationwide Permits, 72 Fed. Reg. 11,092 (Mar. 12, 2007).

84.

UNITED STATES ENV'T PROT. AGENCY & UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS,

CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN

RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES AND CARABELL V. UNITED STATES (2007).

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

89.

United States v. Moses, 2007 WL 2215954 (9th Cir. 2007).

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 10

analysis in Moses that it had in Healdesburg,seemingly giving short-thrift
to the chemical, physical, and biological connections necessary to satisfy Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test. In all likelihood, "[i]f
Congress does not act, and courts across the country are unable to
bring clarity and consistency to the question of wetlands jurisdiction,
the issue will once again end up in the U.S. Supreme Court."' The
agencies' persistently expansive interpretation of the CWA jurisdictional definitions make this result inevitable.
Timothy Cronin & Matthew Smith

90.

Louthan, CourtSharply Split, supra note 5, at 127.

